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The House of Representatives was designed to expand alongside the country’s 
population—yet its membership stopped growing a century ago. Larger and, in 
some cases, unequal sized congressional districts have left Americans with 
worse representation, including in the Electoral College, which allocates electors 
partially on the size of states’ House delegations. This report recommends tying 
the House’s size to the cube root of the nation’s population, which would lead to 
141 more seats. It also calls for an approach to drawing districts that would 
eliminate gerrymandering. 
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Executive Summary
The House of Representatives is not functioning how the 
Constitution’s framers intended. To ensure that the body 
provides fair and democratic representation, the size of the 
House must expand and a new approach should be used for 
drawing congressional districts. 
Other than setting a minimum of at least 65 representatives 
and requiring that each state have at least one, the Constitution 
does not specify a size for the House. But the framers intended 
for the size to increase alongside the country’s population, 
which essentially happened until 1910.
In 1910, Congress approved a reapportionment of House 
seats and an increase in the size of the House to 433. 
The membership was further increased to 435 in 1912 to 
accommodate the entry of Arizona and New Mexico as 
states. However, Congress was unable to pass legislation 
reapportioning the House in 1920. Congress finally passed new 
legislation in 1929, but it froze the size of the House at 435. 
That number, however, was an arbitrary cap. In the interest of 
political expediency, those members who voted for the limit 
forced their successors to represent two to three times as many 
constituents as they themselves represented. The cap of 435 
members still exists today, and it creates a host of problems for 
our representative democracy.
An expansion of the House is important for several reasons. 
First, each member of the House represents—on average—
about 750,000 constituents. In 2050, it is projected that each 
member of Congress will represent a million or more people. 
Everything a congressperson does will become even more 
challenging. Some responsibilities might be entirely neglected. 
Americans who depend on their representatives for help will 
be one of a million. Second, the 435-member cap creates 
unequal representation among districts. That district sizes 
vary so greatly throughout the country is problematic—the 
quality of representation Americans receive in the House 
should not depend on the district in which they reside. This 
disparity extends to presidential elections because the number 
of electors that each state receives in the Electoral College is 
the total of its representation in the House and Senate. Third, 
increasing the size of the House may, in fact, help to fix the 
issue of partisan gerrymandering. The more districts there are, 
the harder it becomes to gerrymander effectively. Increasing 
the size of the House means more accountability, better 
representation, and increased diversity in Congress. 
How many seats should be added to the House? We propose 
using the Cube Root Rule to determine the number. Under the 
Cube Root Rule, the size of a country’s legislature is the cubed 
root of the country’s population. This means the number of 
House seats would be the cubed root of the U.S. population, 
minus 100 (to account for the 100 Senators). Based on the 
2010 census, this approach would add 141 seats to the House 
(and decrease the average constituency size to around 
540,000 people). Adhering to the Cube Root Rule would put 
the U.S. in good company with many other democratic nations. 
Importantly, the Cube Root Rule should be implemented as 
a permanent formula to determine House seats so Congress 
would not need to pass a new law every time the population 
significantly changes. The Cube Root Rule simply responds 
to population changes—as the U.S. population increases or 
decreases, so can the size of Congress. 
To draw districts following the House expansion, we 
recommend a novel plan: the Primary Allocation Model. This 
system would practically eliminate partisan gerrymandering 
and it would increase voter turnout in congressional elections.
Under the Primary Allocation approach, there would be two 
“election rounds.” The first round would take place four to six 
months before the second round. All voters would register 
with a political party (or remain independent) before the first 
round. The first round would be open to the entire state. Voters 
would cast votes for their preferred political party, not for a 
specific candidate. Districts would then be allocated to political 
parties based on results of the first round. Each political party 
with multiple districts would draw a district map across the 
entire state. A political party with one district would have an 
“at large” district covering the entire state. The second round of 
the elections would have the declared candidates campaigning 
against members of their own party in their districts. Voters in 
the second round would be eligible to vote only for candidates 
of the party they supported in the first-round election. 
Allowing political parties to create their own districts would end 
the incentive for partisan gerrymandering. Elections would also 
be far more competitive, which would inspire more voters to 
come to the polls.
4 Why the House of Representatives Must Be Expanded 
Introduction
“The truth is, that in all cases, a certain number at least seems 
to be necessary to secure the benefits of free consultation and 
discussion, and to guard against too easy a combination for 
improper purposes; as on the other hand, the number ought 
at most to be kept within a certain limit, in order to avoid the 
confusion and intemperance of a multitude.”1 
—James Madison, Federalist No. 55
In 1929, there were 435 members of the House of 
Representatives. If that number seems familiar, it may be 
because in 2020 there are still 435 members of the House. 
1 THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison).
This is by design—a 1929 law capped the number of House 
members at 435. Today, this law causes many problems for 
our representative democracy, primarily because dramatic 
growth in the U.S. population has created exceedingly large 
congressional districts. This report addresses how to fix the 
problems inherent with large districts. Part I looks at the history 
of the House, with an emphasis on size and seat allocation. 
Part II discusses the reasons the House should be expanded. 
Part III analyzes methods for expanding the House, ultimately 
recommending a population-based mathematical rule. Finally, 
Part IV discusses a serious problem created by large districts—
partisan gerrymandering—and offers a solution. 
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A. The People’s House
The concept of fair representation has been a crucial element 
of American government since the nation’s founding. The 
Revolution was, in part, a contest about the very definition 
of representation. In England, the House of Commons 
represented every British subject regardless of whether all of 
the subjects could actually vote for the Commons’ membership. 
In this sense, most people living in areas under British rule—
including North America—were only “virtually represented” 
in Parliament.22 American colonists, who were accustomed 
to controlling their local affairs in the directly-elected colonial 
legislatures, lacked a voice in Parliament and resented the 
British policies imposed on them. They rallied behind the now 
familiar motto: “No taxation without representation!”3 After the 
war, the founders struggled to design a system of government 
to better represent the inhabitants of the new country. The 
Articles of Confederation created the first national congress 
to represent the interests of the states; under the Articles, 
each state appointed between two and seven delegates to the 
congress, and each state delegation had one vote.4
This system proved unworkable. The Articles did not vest 
enough power in congress to effectively govern national affairs 
and prevent interstate conflict.5 The founders had largely 
avoided complicated questions of how to balance the interests 
of different states and their citizens in national policymaking 
by leaving most fundamental governing issues to state 
legislatures.6 The failure of this model led the delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787 to design a system with a 
stronger national government. A key question was how such 
a government would best represent and empower individuals, 
communities, and states across the nation.
One of the main concerns that overtook the Convention was the 
size of the House of Representatives.7 It was part of the struggle 
between large and small states that colored most of the 
Convention. Pennsylvania Delegate Benjamin Franklin summed 
up the disagreement, observing, 
2 See Edmund S. Morgan, Colonial Ideas of Parliamentary Power 1764-1766, 5 
WM. & MARY Q. 311, 331-34 (1948).
3 Id.
4 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. V.
5 JOHN FERLING, A LEAP IN THE DARK: THE STRUGGLE TO CREATE THE AMERICAN 291 
(2003).
6 Id.
7 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 78 (2005); see also 
FERLING, supra note 5, at 292.
If a proportional representation takes place, the small 
States contend that their liberties will be in danger. If an 
equality of votes is to be put in its place, the large States 
say their money will be in danger. When a broad table is to 
be made, and the edges of planks do not fit, the artist takes 
a little from both and makes a good joint.8 
The “good joint” that emerged from weeks of gridlock was 
called the “Great Compromise.” It created a bicameral 
legislature with a House, where state population determined 
membership, and a Senate, where each state had two seats 
regardless of population.9
The House of Representatives was intended to be the branch 
of government most intimately tied to popular will. Federalist 
No. 52, which either James Madison or Alexander Hamilton 
authored, argued the House should have “an immediate 
dependence on, and intimate sympathy with, the people.”10
Members of the House have been directly elected by American 
voters since the chamber’s formation.11 Unlike the Senate, the 
House is not a continuing body. Its members must stand for 
election every two years, after which it convenes for a new 
session and essentially reconstitutes itself—electing a Speaker, 
swearing-in the members, and approving a slate of officers 
to administer the institution. Direct, biennial elections and 
its relatively large size have made the House receptive to a 
continual influx of new ideas and priorities that contribute to its 
longstanding reputation as the “People’s House.”
The framers intended for the House to continuously grow.12 
Most agreed that the strength of the lower house would be 
derived from the continued ability of the representatives to 
accurately reflect the “interests and circumstances” of their 
constituents.13 Only through gradual expansion would the 
House remain a democratic and truly representative institution.
8 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 488 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
9 See id. at 524.
10 THE FEDERALIST No. 52.
11 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
12 See Christopher St. John Yates, A House of Our Own or A House We’ve 
Outgrown? An Argument for Increasing the Size of the House of Representatives, 
25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 157, 175-79 (1992); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 
58 (James Madison) (explaining that one of the purposes of the Decennial 
Census was “to augment the number of representatives … under the sole 
limitation that the whole number shall not exceed one for every thirty 
thousand inhabitants”).
13 Yates, supra note 12, 178-79.
I. A History of Representation
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B.  Growth of the House and the Permanent 
Apportionment Act
As the U.S. population grew in the nation’s early history, 
so too did the size of the People’s House. The Constitution 
imposed only one limit on the House’s size: that the “Number 
of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty 
Thousand.”14 Though an amendment was attempted after the 
Convention to tie the House’s size to the nationwide population, 
it fell short of ratification by one state.15
The Constitution requires reapportionment of House seats 
every ten years following the census.16 Congress has used 
several methods to determine the size of the House and the 
allocation of its seats.17
Congress initially used what has been called the Jefferson 
method.18 This approach involved setting a desired population-
to-representative ratio, such as 30,000 to 1, and then dividing 
each state’s population by the population figure in the ratio 
to determine the size of each state’s respective House 
delegation.19 Under this approach, decimals are rounded to the 
lowest whole number.20 If a state’s population was 920,000 
and the ratio chosen was 30,000 to 1, the formula would give 
the state 30 representatives after rounding down from 30.66. 
Congress used the Jefferson method through the expansion 
based on the 1830 census.21 For the rest of the 19th century, 
Congress used either the Webster or Hamilton method, which 
instead asked Congress to choose a number of representatives 
and used people-to-representative ratios and rounding to 
ensure appropriate allocation of those seats.22 In any case, the 
size of the House steadily increased during this period—though 
the ratio of people to representatives had increased to roughly 
70,000 by 1830. Following the 1830 census, the House had 
grown to 240 members from 105 after the first apportionment 
in 1792.23
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
15 See Richard Edward McLawhorn Jr., Apportionment or Size? Why the U.S. 
House of Representatives Should Be Expanded, 62 ALA. L. REV. 1069, 1072 
(2011).
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
17 See McLawhorn, supra note 15, at 1070-76; Methods of Apportionment, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/reference/
apportionment/methods_of_apportionment.html.
18 MICHEL L. BALINSKI & H. PAYTON YOUNG, FAIR REPRESENTATION: MEETING THE IDEAL OF 
ONE MAN, ONE VOTE 23 (2001).
19 Id. at 10-11.
20 Id. at 11.
21 McLawhorn, supra note 15, at 1074.
22 Id. at 1074-75.
23 Id. at 1074.
By the mid-1800s, some legislators were beginning to 
question whether the House should continue to expand 
and whether Congress should engage in a debate over the 
issue every decade. A permanent apportionment bill setting 
the size of the House at 233 was enacted by Congress in 
1850,24 though Congress effectively ignored that cap and 
continued expanding in successive decades.25 Following 
the Civil War, the population expanded dramatically due 
to heavy immigration from Southern Europe to American 
cities.26 By 1900, the House had reached 386 members 
and was expanded to 433 following the 1910 census.27 Two 
more states, Arizona and New Mexico, entered the Union in 
the following decade, bringing the total membership to the 
modern cap of 435.28 In 1920, it was anticipated that to avoid 
any single state losing a representative, the membership 
would need to be expanded by another 60 seats.29
Members of Congress began to believe that the size of the 
House needed to be capped. While some argued for continued 
expansion to allow the House to better represent constituents, 
others asserted that a larger size would prevent the House 
from functioning efficiently.30 Immigration also impacted 
this debate—rural representatives were fearful that the 1920 
apportionment would result in urban areas receiving several 
new seats, which would give those communities much greater 
relative power in the legislature.31 Division over the issue 
prevented the House from being expanded following the 1920 
census.32
Debate on the apportionment issue in Congress lingered 
through the 1920s without a resolution.33 With the 1930 census 
approaching, public pressure was coming to bear on the issue, 
as the population of several states had grown significantly, 
and the allocation of representatives had remained entirely 
unchanged. In 1928, the House took up a bill that would cap 
its membership at 435 representatives and establish an 
automatic allocation procedure following the upcoming census. 
24 BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 18, at 37.
25 McLawhorn, supra note 15, at 1075.
26 Byron J. Harden, House of the Rising Population: The Case for Eliminating the 
435-Member Limit on the U.S. House of Representatives, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 73, 
79 (2011-2012).
27 McLawhorn, supra note 15, at 1075.
28 Charles A. Kromkowski & John A. Kromkowski, Why 435? A Question of 
Political Arithmetic, 24 POLITY 129, 133 (1991).
29 McLawhorn, supra note 15, at 1076.
30 Id.
31 Harden, supra note 25, at 79.
32 Kromkowski & Kromkowski, supra note 28, at 134.
33 McLawhorn, supra note 15, at 1077.
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Ultimately, the legislation gave Congress approval power over 
the method used in any given reapportionment, with a default 
to the method used in the prior reapportionment if no approval 
was given.34 The Permanent Apportionment Act became law in 
1929.35
C. The House Today
The Permanent Apportionment Act continues to dictate the 
size of the House and the allocation of seats among the states. 
The issue has not been substantively revisited by Congress 
since the Act’s passage nearly a century ago, and it has received 
limited scholarly attention in recent decades. As a result, 
congressional districts have more than tripled in size over the 
34 See Yates, supra note 12, at 180.
35 The Permanent Apportionment Act of 1929, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
https://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1901-1950/The-
Permanent-Apportionment-Act-of-1929/.
last century—from an average of roughly 212,000 inhabitants 
after the 1910 Census to about 710,000 inhabitants following 
the 2010 Census.36 It is projected that each member of 
Congress will represent a million or more people by 2050.37
At a minimum, the ballooning size of districts suggests the 
House is functioning in a way that provides lower quality 
representation to constituents than when Congress’s 
membership froze in 1911.38 In recent years, a small number of 
scholars and journalists have begun arguing that apportionment 
should be revisited as a matter of democratic prerogative.39 This 
is where our analysis begins. 




38 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an 
Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1248 (1989) (“The 
Framers believed that the potential danger of factionalism in the House 
of Representatives would be counteracted by its close dependence on 
the people and its impermanence relative to the other institutions of 
government.”).
39 See, e.g., Editorial Board, America Needs a Bigger House, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/09/opinion/
expanded-house-representatives-size.html; Dylan Matthews, The Case 
for Massively Expanding the U.S. House of Representatives, in One Chart, VOX 
(June 4, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/6/4/17417452/congress-
representation-ratio-district-size-chart-graph; Chris Wilson, How to Fix 
the House of Representatives in One Easy, Radical Step, TIME (Oct. 15, 2018), 
http://time.com/5423623/house-representatives-number-seats/.
8 Why the House of Representatives Must Be Expanded 
II. Why The House Must Be Expanded
Islanders one representative for every 529,820 residents.43 
Courts have not applied the “one person, one vote” doctrine 
to congressional districts across state lines; it is only a 
restriction on the drawing of legislative districts within states.44 
However, constitutional doctrine notwithstanding, the quality 
of Americans’ representation should not depend on the state 
they happen to live in. Increasing the number of representatives 
who can be allocated among the states makes the task of 
equal apportionment easier by increasing the pool of seats 
to be equally divided and produces more parity in interstate 
representation ratios.
B. Mitigating Partisan Gerrymandering
Increasing the size of the House may limit partisan 
gerrymandering.45 After seats are apportioned every ten 
years, each state is responsible for drawing districts. Partisan 
gerrymandering of these districts has been a feature of 
American democracy for centuries, but recent decades have 
seen particularly extreme cases of statehouse majorities using 
their districting power to greatly diminish the representation of 
the opposing political party.46 Larger legislatures make it more 
difficult to gerrymander effectively.47 If there was a state with 
100 residents and 100 congressional districts, gerrymandering 
would be impossible; if there are 50 congressional districts, it 
would not be impossible, but very difficult. The House would 
never be expanded to such a point that gerrymandering could 
be wholly eliminated, but a larger House would make it harder 
to entirely lock out a political minority of representation and 
cement the majority’s hold on power.
C. Electoral College Parity
Each state’s vote total in the Electoral College is derived 
from its total congressional representation—the sum of its 
two senators and its total House delegation.48 This means 
legislative apportionment and representation are inherently 
tied to presidential selection. The lack of parity in House 
apportionment among states impacts states’ influence in 
the Electoral College. Large states would be the primary 
43 Id.
44 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964).
45 Harden, supra note 26, 98-99.
46 See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013); Alabama Legislative 
Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015); Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 
1455 (2017). See also Gerrymandering at the Supreme Court, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUST., https://www.brennancenter.org/gerrymandering-scotus (last visited 
Aug. 9, 2019).
47 Id.
48 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
Expanding the House would allow the chamber to conform to 
the framers’ vision for it and to modern political and popular 
notions of what representative democracy should be. We 
identify eight discrete and distinct reasons for this change. We 
also respond to the primary arguments made by opponents of a 
House expansion.
A.  Local Responsiveness and Equal 
Representation
As districts grow in size,40 more constituents are deprived of 
adequate representation. To win re-election, candidates are 
practically required to bargain with some interest groups over 
others within their districts. The interest groups and political 
minorities that candidates eschew are ultimately losers in 
the electoral process, both deprived of a functional vote and 
representation of their interests in the House. A larger House 
corrects for this issue by granting more representatives to 
each state and allowing those new districts to capture the 
preferences of a greater number of political communities.
Large districts may make it harder for constituents to receive 
help navigating the federal bureaucracy. Many Americans rely 
on their members of Congress to obtain essential information 
about government programs and benefits. By 2050, Americans 
who depend on their representatives for help will be one of a 
million; members and their staffs will necessarily have to triage 
constituent concerns to an even greater degree than they do 
now. Expanding the House would allow representatives to 
provide more hands-on help to constituents and relieve the 
burden on each member’s staff.
The cap on House members creates unequal representation 
among districts.41 Each state’s congressional delegation 
changes as a result of population shifts, with many states either 
gaining or losing seats after each census. But this process is 
imperfect. Given the increasingly wide population disparity 
between small and large states, it is mathematically impossible 
to ensure that each member represents the same number 
of constituents, or even roughly the same number in many 
cases. Currently, Montana’s population of 1,050,493 people 
grants it just one House member.42 Rhode Island, has only a 
slightly larger population, with 1,059,639 residents, but that’s 
enough to give it two representatives, which grants Rhode 
40 Drew Desilver, U.S. Population Keeps Growing, but House of Representatives 
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beneficiaries of a House expansion because they typically have 
higher than average population-to-representative ratios due to 
the limited number of seats and the requirement that each state 
receive at least one. But some small states, such as Montana, 
that have high ratios would also benefit. Expanding the House 
mitigates these parity disadvantages and cabins the small-state 
advantage in the Electoral College to the two-vote baseline, 
which is the advantage the system was originally intended to 
confer.
D.  Preventing Corruption and Capture by 
Special Interests
A stagnant political body is vulnerable to capture by powerful 
interests. The House is no exception. This concern was 
paramount among supporters of the proposed constitutional 
amendment in the Framing Era to tie the House’s membership 
to population growth.49 They feared corruption was more likely 
where representatives were not intimately familiar with their 
voters, and that the powerful would more easily commandeer a 
smaller body than a larger one.50 Special interests have become 
intimately familiar with the operation of both chambers of 
Congress, and exert considerable influence over committee 
assignments, legislative priorities, primary candidates, 
campaigns, and government oversight of their activities.51 
There are manifold reasons for this phenomenon beyond the 
structure of the House, but increasing its membership would 
disrupt these dynamics by requiring some changes to House 
administration. 
Additionally, large districts make campaigns costlier. Winning 
the support of a majority of voters in a 750,000-person district 
requires significant financial resources that candidates often 
need to obtain from wealthy benefactors and powerful interest 
groups. An expanded House would reduce the financial barrier 
to entry for candidates and, in effect, decrease the leverage that 
well-financed groups have over them. 
E. Third Party Representation
Third parties struggle to obtain any representation at the 
federal level. This is in part because congressional districts are 
too large for third-party candidates to reach a critical level of 
49 Anthony J. Gaughan, To End Gerrymandering: The Canadian Model for 
Reforming the Congressional Redistricting Process in the United States, 41 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 999, 1006 (2013).
50 Yates, supra note 12, at 177-78.
51 See Richard A. Smith, Interest Group Influence in the U. S. Congress, 20 LEGIS. 
STUD. Q. 89, 139 (Feb. 1995).
support, either because of high financial costs or because of the 
necessary compromises with interest groups. Smaller districts 
allow independent and third-party candidates to run issue-
driven campaigns that speak specifically to the concerns of a 
geographic community. They also make it easier for candidates 
to reach the critical number of voters needed to win a seat. 
Finally, more seats in the House diminishes the significance 
of any single seat in determining a congressional majority. A 
third-party voter may therefore feel less concerned that their 
third-party vote will be “wasted” or will “spoil” the election of 
a preferred major party candidate and preferred congressional 
majority. Given the confines of the plurality system, House 
expansion may be the most effective means of promoting 
independent and third-party representation.
F. Diversity
Incumbency is very powerful in federal elections, especially 
in safe districts where a major party is overwhelmingly likely 
to win regardless of its candidates. Expanding the House 
would not eliminate the benefits of incumbency. However, an 
immediate increase in House seats to accommodate for several 
decades of stagnation would create tremendous opportunity 
for new voices to enter government. Overwhelmingly, these 
voices would likely be younger, more female, more non-white, 
and more demographically representative of America than 
the current makeup of Congress. Political and socioeconomic 
diversity would also be enhanced, as discussed.
G. Party Conformance and Control
Expanding the House may help undo the bitter partisan 
dynamic in the chamber. A larger House would create greater 
opportunity for members to defect from their parties on key 
issues and build coalitions with other members to advance 
legislation and oversight prerogatives. An increase in third 
party representation could also reduce partisanship by denying 
a major party a majority or forcing some kind of coalition 
government.
H. Scope of Work
Finally, expanding the House may make some administrative 
functions easier. The scope of Congress’s powers and work 
have only expanded in the modern era, and the issues that 
each congressperson deals with, either in representing their 
community or in their committee and legislative assignments, 
has only continued to grow. Representatives in the House 
arguably have too much work, and do not perform their jobs 
as well as they would like because of it. Smaller districts would 
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reduce the number of salient interests representatives must 
consider in legislating because their districts would have fewer 
political communities. Additionally, a larger House allows 
committee work and assignments to be distributed among 
more members, giving each member more time to focus on 
their remaining tasks.
J. Responding to Critics
The idea of lifting the 435-member limit is not without its 
critics. This Part addresses some of their concerns.
1. Physical Space
Some may argue that the Capitol building cannot accommodate 
more members of Congress. One of the primary concerns 
behind this criticism is that insufficient space could undermine 
the body’s deliberative nature by preventing members from 
gathering in the House chamber to debate and collaborate on 
important legislation. 
But the current House chamber is almost certainly capable of 
seating more than 435 people; in fact, it does so every year at 
the State of the Union Address, when most, if not all, Senators, 
Cabinet secretaries, Supreme Court justices, and military 
service chiefs assemble on the House floor. Even if the current 
facilities were not large enough, more space could be created. 
Office buildings could be erected within the Capitol complex to 
accommodate more members, and the Capitol building itself 
could be modified or expanded to allow every member to fit on 
the floor. Additionally, most negotiation and deliberation does 
not take place on the floor of the House—it occurs in committee 
meetings, behind closed doors, and in other settings.52 Often, 
House members speak to a mostly empty chamber when they 
make speeches from the floor.53 Others members and their 
staffs track the proceedings on the floor on C-SPAN from their 
offices.
2. Ine!ciency
A larger number of representatives with more divergent 
viewpoints could result in some inefficiencies, such as making 
consensus-building harder and more time consuming. Creating 
space for more views would involve making the effort and 
52 Kromkowski & Kromkowski, supra note 28, at 144. 
53 Id. 
taking the time to accommodate those new perspectives. 
But hierarchies will still exist in House administration such 
that individual representatives will look to leadership—in 
committees, in their party, or otherwise—to help develop their 
views on specific issues. If members have a smaller committee 
load, as would probably result from a larger House, they may 
also be able to develop greater expertise and influence in the 
policy areas they choose to focus on. Additionally, if expanding 
the House reduces partisan advantage from gerrymandering, 
there will likely be a greater number of swing districts in the 
House, increasing the incentive for compromise across the 
aisle and the likelihood that legislation can be passed. Though 
coordinating among more members would present new 
challenges, there are offsetting benefits and good reasons for 
the additional work it would require.
3. Cost and Size of Government
Finally, some may question whether taxpayers should foot the 
bill for an expansion of Congress, particularly at a time when 
public satisfaction with Congress (and politicians broadly) is 
especially low.54 But there are two strong counterpoints. First, 
the budget for congressional salaries is already an exceedingly 
low percentage of the total federal budget—a representative’s 
salary and office budget totals about $1 million each year.55 
Appropriating for the salaries of even 200 more members 
would not make a substantial dent in the budget. Second, 
dissatisfaction with Congress may be impacted by the structure 
of the body. A more representative Congress may produce 
greater public approval, and better political outcomes for the 
body politic. This could especially be true if a House expansion 
reins in the influence of moneyed interests. And some studies 
even suggest an increased legislature size would reduce 
government spending in aggregate.56
54 Congress and the Public, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1600/
congress-public.aspx (last visited Aug. 7, 2019).
55 IDA A. BRUDNICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL300064, SALARIES AND ALLOWANCES: IN 
BRIEF 5 (2018), https://www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/9c14ec69-c4e4-4bd8-
8953-f73daa1640e4.pdf; IDA A. BRUDNICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40962, 
MEMBERS’ REPRESENTATIONAL ALLOWANCE: HISTORY AND USAGE (2019), https://fas.
org/sgp/crs/misc/R40962.pdf.
56 See, e.g., Larry Sabato, Expand the House of Representatives, DEMOCRACY J. 
MAG., Spring 2008, https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/8/expand-
the-house-of-representatives/.
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For a century and a half after the first Congress met, Congress 
expanded the House and allocated seats on a piecemeal 
basis as the nation’s population grew. Partisan and legislative 
incentives always permeated the process—re-allocations 
rarely took seats away from states,57 for example—but these 
tensions reached a breaking point when no reapportionment 
occurred after the 1920 census. Congress further abdicated 
its role in 1929 when it capped the size of the House at 435 
and delegated some of its reallocation power to the executive 
branch.58 Following the 1940 and 1941 amendments to the 
Permanent Apportionment Act, reapportionment was placed 
on “automatic pilot.”59 
Congress cannot continue to ignore the issues caused by the 
House’s insufficient size. The institution is not living up to the 
framers’ vision for it. Expansion of the chamber’s membership 
will help it function as intended and more effectively serve 
the nation. This section examines four practical and politically 
realistic methods of expansion: two population-based rules 
(the Cube Root Rule and the Wyoming Rule), an incremental 
approach, and a one-time expansion. This section ultimately 
recommends passage of a single piece of legislation to repeal 
the Permanent Apportionment Act and tie the size of the House 
to the cube root of the nation’s population. 
A. Four Methods of Expansion
Before arguing for the Cube Root Rule as the best approach 
to House expansion, we describe and analyze that method 
alongside three other viable approaches to increasing the 
House’s membership.
57 Congressional Apportionment, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.
house.gov/Institution/Apportionment/Apportionment/ (last visited May 
15, 2019). 
58 McLawhorn, supra note 15, at 1079.
59 Kromkowksi & Kromskowsi, supra note 28, at 134-35. 
III. Expanding the House
1. The Cube Root Rule
The Cube Root Rule is a commonly-suggested formula in 
academic literature for determining a national legislature’s 
size. In Rein Taagepera’s influential 1972 article, The Size of 
National Assemblies, Taagepera noted a geometric pattern 
among population size and assembly size throughout the 
world.60 After examining the size of the lower chambers of 
national assemblies in the 1960s, he found that the size of a 
country’s national assembly often approximated the cube root 
of its population.61 Since Taagepera’s findings, the “Cube Root 
Rule” has been widely studied,62 and research suggests the 
U.S. roughly adhered to this calculation until 1910.63 Research 
also reveals that many national assemblies still conform to 
this rule. Figure 1 displays the population, cube root of the 
population, and national legislature size of 37 countries that 
comprised the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development. in 2017. The size of most of the legislatures is 
either very close to the cube root of the population or contains 
more representatives than the cube root would suggest.64  
Congress, however, is significantly smaller than the cube root of 
the U.S. population. Among the countries listed in Figure 1, only 
Colombia has a greater negative discrepancy between the cube 
root of its population and the size of its legislature. 
60 Rein Taagepera, The Size of National Assemblies, 1 SOC. SCI. RESEARCH 385 
(1972).
61 Id. at 386; Arend Lijphart, Reforming the House: Three Moderately Radical 
Proposals, 31 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 10, 12 (1998). 
62 Jeffrey W. Ladewig & Mathew P. Jasinski, On the Causes and Consequences 
of and Remedies for Interstate Malapportionment of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, 6 PERSP. ON POL. 89, 98 (2008). 
63 Id. at 99-100. 
64 Id. at 99. 
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Figure 1.65 




Di!erence of National Legislature  
Size and Cube Root
Australia 23,800,000 288 150 -138
Austria 8,679,000 206 183 -23
Belgium 11,288,000 224 150 -74
Canada 35,950,000 330 337 +7
Chile 17,763,000 261 120 -141
Colombia 48,229,000 364 166 -198
Czech Republic 10,604,000 220 200 -20
Denmark 5,689,000 179 179 0
Estonia 1,315,000 110 101 -9
Finland 5,482,000 176 200 +24
France 64,457,000 401 577 +176
Germany 81,708,000 434 630 +196
Greece 11,218,000 224 300 +76
Hungary 9,784,000 214 199 -15
Iceland 330,000 69 63 -6
Ireland 4,700,000 168 158 -10
Israel 8,065,000 201 120 -81
Italy 5,9504,000 390 630 +240
Japan 127,975,000 504 475 -29
Korea 50,594,000 370 300 -70
Latvia 1,993,000 126 100 -26
Lithuania 2,932,000 143 141 -2
Luxembourg 567,000 83 60 -23
Mexico 125,891,000 501 500 -1
Netherlands 16,938,000 257 150 -107
New Zealand 4,615,000 166 119 -47
Norway 5,200,000 173 169 -4
Poland 38,265,000 337 460 +123
Portugal 10,418,000 218 230 +12
Slovak Republic 5,439,000 176 150 -26
Slovenia 2,075,000 128 90 -38
Spain 46,398,000 359 350 -9
Sweden 9,764,000 214 349 -135
Switzerland 8,320,000 203 200 -3
Turkey 78,271,000 428 550 +122
United Kingdom 65,397,000 403 650 +247
United States 319,929,000 684 535 -149
* Data concerning population was provided in thousands. It is based on 2015 population data. 
** Cube root is rounded to the nearest hundred. 
*** Generally, the national legislature size refers only to the lower house in each country. For the United States, the number is the combined size of the House and Senate.
65 Government at a Glance 2017: Contextual Factors, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,  
http://www.oecd.org/gov/government-at-a-glance-2017-contextual-factors.pdf (last visited May 15, 2019). 
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Why do most legislatures conform to this rule? The reasons 
are not clear. Every nation determines the size of its legislature 
differently. Taagepera theorized that conformance to the Cube 
Root Rule creates the optimal balance between representative-
constituent communication and communication among 
legislators themselves.66
The Cube Root Rule provides for the growth of a legislature with 
the size of the population it represents—a natural evolution in a 
robust, representative democracy. Over time, the practicalities 
of governing—like collaborating with other legislators—start to 
become more difficult the larger a legislature expands. These 
consequences are met, however, by the slowing rate of growth 
of the legislature under the cube root formula. In other words, 
the growth will be marginal relative to additions to the total 
national population. In a nation as large as the U.S., the Cube 
Root Rule would provide a consistent and measured approach 
to expanding the legislature in response to population growth, 
and if Taagepera’s theory is correct, it will optimize constituent 
responsiveness and congressional relationships.
Figure 2.
Year Total U.S. Population67 Cube root of U.S. 
population (to 2 
decimals)
Total Number of 
House seats
Change from prior size Average Constituency 
2010 308,745,538 675.88 576 +141 536,017
2020 332,527,548 692.80 593 +17 560,755
2030 357,975,719 710.04 610 +17 586,845
2040 379,392,779 723.93 623 +13 608,977
Literature advocating the Cube Root Rule’s application to the 
House is divided on whether the number of House seats should 
account for the 100 Senate seats. Those who argue against 
including Senate seats cite Taagepera’s original finding that 
the size of many countries’ lower (usually largest) legislative 
chambers approximate the cube root of the countries’ 
populations,68 while others eschew this finding to advocate 
for counting the total seats in the House and Senate.69 The 
latter group views the Senate as a more significant body than 
small chambers in other countries, which, they argue, supports 
including all federal legislators when applying the Cube Root 
66 Ladewig & Jasinksi, supra note 62, at 98. 
67 Observed and Total Population for the U.S. and the States, 2010-2040, 
DEMOGRAPHICS RES. GROUP, WELDON COOPER CTR. FOR PUB. SERVICE, https://
demographics.coopercenter.org/national-population-projections (last 
updated Dec. 2018). 
68 See Lijphart, supra note 61; see also Ladewig & Jasinski, supra note 62, at 99.
69 See Daniel Greenberg, Why 435? How We Can Change the Size of the House 
of Representatives, FAIRVOTE (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.fairvote.org/
how_we_can_change_the_size_of_the_house_of_representatives; see also 
America Needs a Bigger House, supra note 39. 
Rule.70 The majority of proposals advocating adoption of the 
Cube Root Rule in the U.S. have taken the latter approach. 
Figure 2 illustrates the number of House seats that would be 
added under that system.
An initial increase in representation under the Cube Root Rule 
based on the population in the 2010 census would result in 
about 141 additional House seats. Subsequent increases would 
be relatively stable according to current population projections 
at roughly 15 new seats per decade, even alongside population 
growth of over 70 million people. The hallmark feature of the 
Cube Root Rule—slowing legislature growth as the population 
gets larger71—is clear in this model. The projected population 
growth between decades is roughly equivalent in the table 
(about 21-25 million), but by 2040, this growth produces only 
13 additional seats (compared to 17 additional seats in both 
2020 and 2030). This trend is even more apparent on a larger 
scale. At 500 million residents, the Cube Root Rule produces 
a total legislature size of roughly 800; at 1 billion, it calls for 
exactly 1,000—an increase of only 25% when the population 
is doubled. Accordingly, one would expect successively 
smaller increases in decades after 2040 even if large and fast 
population growth continues.
Slower growth in the House over time makes the body more 
manageable and avoids the potential for runaway growth in the 
chamber. However, under the Cube Root Rule, as the national 
population increases, so does the average constituency size; 
in Figure 2, the average district grows by 13% from 2010 to 
2040. Many of the reasons for expanding the House discussed 
in this report (specifically: responsiveness, representativeness, 
proportionality, and anti-corruption) are intimately tied with 
a decrease in constituency size. A system that increases that 
metric over time may mitigate the important, beneficial effects 
of additional House seats.
70 See America Needs a Bigger House, supra note 39.
71 See Brian Frederick, Not Quite a Full House: The Case for Enlarging the House of 
Representatives, 28 BRIDGEWATER REV., Dec. 2009, at 23, 23.
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Notably, an important benefit of the Cube Root Rule is that 
it could decrease the discrepancies in district size across the 
country. An article published before the 2010 census found 
that application of the Cube Root Rule would “significantly 
diminish” the extent of interstate malapportionment.72 
Among states with the largest discrepancies between 
average constituency size and the national average, the 
discrepancy would be reduced by 40 percent.73 Among the 
ten largest states, the discrepancy would be reduced by 56 
percent.74 The article acknowledged that though not every 
state would see a decrease in the discrepancy between its 
average constituency size and the national average, the 
representation of each person would become more equal in 
Congress.75 
Although the Cube Root Rule has support in the political 
science community, convincing lawmakers to support it may 
prove difficult. Because the Cube Root Rule is a formula based 
on data that Congress cannot control (the national population), 
lawmakers may favor an incremental or onetime expansion 
where they control how much the House size increases and 
at what pace. Furthermore, the Cube Root Rule’s higher 
complexity compared to other approaches may present 
challenges in fostering public understanding and support. 
Lawmakers will probably not act on a specific method of 
expansion unless they have the support of voters.  
Figure 3. 
Year Total U.S. Population76 Population of Smallest 
State77
Total Number of 
House seats
Change from prior 
decade
Average Constituency 
2010 308,745,538 563,626 (WY) 548 +113 563,404
2020 332,527,548 585,380 (WY) 568 +20 585,436
2030 357,975,719 605,972 (WY) 591 +23 605,712
2040 379,392,779 601,865 (VT) 630 +39 602,211
2. The Wyoming Rule
The Wyoming Rule is an alternative and uniquely American 
approach to a mathematical population-based rule for 
legislature size. Its purpose is to apply the “one person, one 






vote” doctrine on a national scale.78 Under the Wyoming Rule, 
the total national population would be divided by the population 
of the smallest state (which is currently Wyoming),79 and the 
resulting quotient would be rounded to the nearest whole 
number.80 This number would become the size of the House.81 
Figure 3 illustrates the rule’s application to the House today 
and for the projected population for the next three decades. 
Interestingly, the formulation would come to depend on the 
state of Vermont, as Vermont is projected to have the smallest 
state population by 2040.82 
The Wyoming Rule initially expands the House by a smaller 
number than the Cube Root Rule, but it dictates a larger total 
body by 2040. While the average constituency is smaller than 
the average constituency produced by the Cube Root Rule from 
2010 to 2030, by 2040, the average constituency under the 
Wyoming Rule is larger than the average constituency produced 
by the Cube Root Rule. 
Making the average House district represent the same number 
of people as the smallest state’s population produces less 
difference in constituency sizes across the nation. Theoretically, 
this deviation would be smaller than under the Cube Root Rule 
because the size of each constituency is measured according to 
the size of the smallest constituency (the smallest state). But 
this feature leads to a potential downside of the 
Wyoming Rule—the smallest state will always only have one 
representative. This could lead to opposition from states that 
are at risk of becoming the smallest state. However, there 
are currently seven states with a single representative in the 
House.83 After the next census, Rhode Island is expected to lose 
78 See FAIRVOTE, MORE MEMBERS, MORE VOICES: POLICIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 





82 Observed and Total Population, supra note 70. 
83 The seven states are: Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming.
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one of its two seats, and, unless offset by another small state, 
the House will have more single-member state delegations than 
it has ever had.84 This is the predictable result of a system with 
low population states and an increasing average constituency 
size nationally; inevitably, more small states will fall closer 
in total population to the average district size and lose their 
additional representatives. The Wyoming Rule tethers the 
ratio low enough so that fewer states are stuck with a single 
representative and provides plenty of additional seats for larger 
states to avoid being grossly underrepresented.85
The benefits of the Wyoming Rule would extend into 
presidential elections. Under the Rule, the apportionment 
of votes each state gets in the Electoral College would more 
closely align with the population of each state.86 As explained in 
Part II, the total number of electoral votes each state receives is 
its total number of representatives in both houses of Congress. 
If congressional districts are more or less the same size, then 
the outcome of the Electoral College would, theoretically, more 
closely align with the outcome of the popular vote. However, 
a recent study of presidential elections dating back to 1912 
found that while the Wyoming Rule would have changed the 
number of electoral votes presidential candidates received, 
the outcomes of the elections would not have changed.87 
Thus, while the Wyoming Rule would theoretically align the 
outcome of the popular vote more closely with the outcome of 
the Electoral College vote, it would not necessarily align closely 
enough to change the outcome of an election where there is a 
split between the popular and electoral votes. This possibility 
exists because the Wyoming Rule would still produce variance 
in district population size88—every state population will not be 
an exact multiple of the population of the smallest state. 
The key criticism of the Wyoming Rule is that tying the size of 
the House to the population of the smallest state is too arbitrary. 
As shown in Figure 3, the representative-to-population ratio 
changes decade to decade according to the smallest state’s 
population. There is nothing particularly reasoned about that level 
84 Sean Trende, It’s Time to Increase the Size of the House, UNIV. OF VA. CTR. FOR 
POL. (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/
its-time-to-increase-the-size-of-the-house/.
85 See FAIRVOTE, MORE MEMBERS, MORE VOICES, supra note 76, at 9-10; see also 
Charles M. Biles, Congressional Apportionment: A Liberal Arts Perspective, 
DIGITAL COMMONS @ HUMBOLDT ST. U. 36 (Sept. 20, 2016), https://pdfs.
semanticscholar.org/c7d4/3270e47c1a129666c787c6a9ea779979ee11.
pdf.
86 Implementing the “Wyoming Rule,” DAILY KOS (June 5, 2018), https://www.
dailykos.com/stories/2018/7/5/1778149/-Implementing-the-Wyoming-
Rule.
87 FAIRVOTE, MORE MEMBERS, MORE VOICES, supra note 76, at 12. 
88 Id. at 15.
of representativeness—though it ensures some degree of parity 
between state representation, it is not at all consistent from year-
to-year, nor is it necessarily the optimal size of a congressional 
district. The population of Vermont is predicted to decline in every 
decade prior to 2040;89 if it continued on this trend (and Vermont 
remained the smallest state), the Wyoming Rule would produce 
an increasingly small average constituency size in the future. 
Because of the Wyoming Rule’s arbitrariness, the number of 
House seats is not guaranteed to move in one direction, or at 
a measured rate. The size of the nation’s smallest state can 
vary dramatically, significantly altering the size of the House. 
For example, had the Wyoming Rule been used in 1920, there 
would have been over 1,000 House seats.90 The possibility of 
drastic changes in state population highlights the extent to 
which the Wyoming Rule could become unworkable. 
Though the Wyoming Rule is arbitrary, it is more easily 
explained than perhaps any of the four methods of expansion 
discussed in this report. On its surface, the Wyoming 
Rule makes sense—each district has the same number 
of people as the smallest state. This seeming equality 
could be appealing to lawmakers and the public and make 
implementation of this approach the easiest to accomplish. 
Though the Wyoming Rule may not be the best method for 
expansion, it could be the only method that gets enough 
support from lawmakers and the public to actually achieve an 
expansion of the House. 
3. The Incremental Approach
Another approach could involve increasing the House’s size 
incrementally every decade by a predetermined number. One 
method of incremental expansion, proposed in a 1991 article by 
Charles A. Kromkowski and John A. Kromkowski, contemplated 
“marginal but decennial” increases in House size.91 The article 
envisioned a 15-member increase each decade.92 The relevant 
calculations for such an increase are included in Figure 4, with 
an adjustment made to reflect the time passed since the article 
was published. A very small incremental increase might attract 
less opposition but it would very likely produce only minimal 
benefits, if any. 
89 Observed and Total Population, supra note 70.
90 FAIRVOTE, supra note 76, at 9. Nevada was the smallest state in 1920, at 
around 77,000 residents, which meant the state represented about .07% of 
the U.S. population. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 32-33 (1921), https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/1921/
compendia/statab/43ed/1920-02.pdf.
91 Kromkowski & Kromkowski, supra note 28, at 144. 
92 Id. at 145. 
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Figure 4. 
Year Total U.S. Population93 Total Number of House seats Change from prior decade Average Constituency Size
2010 308,745,538 480 +45 643,221
2020 332,527,548 495 +15 671,998
2030 357,975,719 510 +15 696,276
2040 379,392,779 525 +15 711,482
 
Alternatively, the increment could be set at a level that would 
roughly maintain the same average constituency size. This 
approach is uniquely workable at this moment, where popu-
lation growth over the next three decades is expected to be 
remarkably consistent.94 The House could leave the number 
unchanged for the foreseeable future, or re-visit the number 
once the “planned-for” period has expired (in say, 2040). Figure 
5 illustrates what this particular approach would look like if 
Congress determined the average constituency should be about 
660,000 people. This approach would require a 35-member 
increase in the House every ten years. 
Figure 5. 
Year Total U.S. Population95 Total Number of House seats Change from prior decade Average Constituency Size
2010 308,745,538 470 +35 656,905
2020 332,527,548 505 +35 658,470
2030 357,975,719 540 +35 662,918
2040 379,392,779 575 +35 659,814
Figure 6. 
Year U.S. Population Number of House Seats Average Constituency Size
2010 308,745,538 485 636,589
2020 332,527,548 485 685,624
2030 357,975,719 485 738,094
2040 379,392,779 485 782,253
The main benefit of an incremental approach is foresight. 
The pre-determined expansion gives House members time 
to anticipate necessary practical changes that come with 
expansion, like physical space and budget. It also gives 
political parties and institutions a clear sense of how many 
new lawmakers to anticipate each decade, which could 
help them adjust their campaign strategies and resource 
allocations. Finally, legislators would feel more in control of 
the expansion process. An incremental approach relies on an 
expansion pace set by Congress, as opposed to one subject 
93 Observed and Total Population, supra note 70. 
94 See id. 
95 Id.  
to less predictable variations driven by the cube root of the 
population (the Cube Root Rule) or population of the smallest 
state (the Wyoming Rule). A plan that puts Congress in 
control and uses straightforward math would likely be quite 
palatable to legislators. It would afford Congress the freedom 
to decide growth rate and what goals it wants to accomplish 
by expansion. The plan’s simplicity might also attract more 
public support for the plan than some of the other possible 
approaches.  
A formidable downside of the incremental approach is its 
dependence on population projections. These estimates cannot 
accommodate for unforeseen mass changes in population. If 
the national population changed drastically and Congress felt 
compelled to act, it would need to pass a new expansion law. 
The possibility of unanticipated changes in population weighs 
against the benefit of foresight that an incremental approach 
would provide. 
4. A Onetime Expansion
Perhaps the most straightforward approach to expanding the 
House is a onetime expansion. Like the incremental approach, 
the number of added seats could be any integer, and it could 
be chosen to achieve any number of goals. In an interview we 
conducted with Dr. Norman Ornstein of American Enterprise 
Institute, he proposed adding 50 additional seats to the 
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House.96 Dr. Ornstein called 50 additional seats a “pragmatic 
number.”97 The addition of 50 seats would bring the House’s 
size to 485 members. Figure 6 illustrates what this onetime 
expansion would look like over the next several decades. 
A major benefit of this approach is the freedom it provides 
to Congress. As with the incremental approach, lawmakers 
can choose any integer, based on any (or no) criteria. An even 
larger expansion may be possible with the onetime expansion 
method as opposed to the incremental approach because a 
large onetime expansion might be more palatable to many 
than a change every decade. There would only need to be one-
time changes to the Capitol complex’s physical spaces and 
committees’ functioning and make-up. Congress could also 
have time to learn how to function efficiently as a larger body, 
and not need to readjust every decade after there is a new 
addition of seats. 
It would be hard to tie the onetime expansion to national 
population changes. The onetime expansion sets a pre-
determined course that does not accommodate for 
unanticipated fluctuations. If Congress determined after the 
fact that the size of the House was seriously at odds with the 
national population, it could pass a new expansion bill, but this 
would reduce the benefits of using a one-and-done expansion 
method in the first place. 
Because the onetime expansion method does not 
accommodate for changes in the national population, there 
is a strong probability that, should this method of expansion 
be utilized, the size of the average constituency would not be 
greatly decreased from its current levels (or, the substantial 
decrease would last only a decade or two). Figure 6 illustrates 
that if 50 seats were added, the average constituency size 
would surpass the current average constituency of roughly 
750,000 people by 2040. If lawmakers could be convinced 
that more than 50 additional seats were needed in the House, 
then the average constituency size could stay below current 
levels for a longer period of time. However, population increases 
would eventually catch up to the addition of seats, and the 
current average constituency would be surpassed.
96 Dr. Norman J. Ornstein proposed an expansion of the House as a way 
to address the inequity of the Electoral College. Video Interview with Dr. 




We recommend repealing the Permanent Apportionment Act 
and codifying the Cube Root Rule as the method to determine 
the size of the House. Additionally, we recommend a public 
education campaign to increase understanding of the benefits 
of expanding the House and how the Cube Root Rule works. 
Public knowledge will be essential to garnering enough support 
for Congress to take action.  
1.  Why the Cube Root Rule is the Best Method 
for Expansion
The Cube Root Rule is the most practical and beneficial method 
to expand the House. The greatest advantage it has over the 
other methods discussed here is that it is tied to the national 
population; as such, it is a dynamic formula that is able to 
respond to both increases and decreases in the population. The 
Wyoming Rule only considers the population of the smallest 
state, while the incremental approach and onetime expansion 
are not necessarily influenced by population. If population 
is considered under these approaches, it is only projected 
population figures. The Wyoming Rule, incremental approach, 
and onetime expansion are also incapable of responding to 
national population decreases without additional legislation. 
Because the Cube Root Rule automatically accounts for 
population changes, Congress would not need to enact any 
subsequent legislation. 
There is evidence that the Cube Root Rule creates the optimal-
sized legislature with regards to communication between 
lawmakers and communication between lawmakers and their 
constituents. Furthermore, the Cube Root Rule would put 
the size of Congress in-line with legislatures in other modern 
democracies.98
Congress is deeply polarized and gridlocked.99 Unsurprisingly, 
the vast majority of Americans disapprove of how it is 
working.100 Large scale reform is needed to make the House 
function how its architects at the Constitutional Convention 
intended. Tying the House’s membership to the population 
and allowing its size to automatically adapt after every census 
based on a predetermined formula would make the chamber 
more effective. Americans would receive better representation. 
98 Government at a Glance 2017, supra note 65. 
99 Mark Hay, Breaking: Congress Continues to Do Pretty Much Nothing, VICE 
(July 5, 2018, 6:13 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ev8gbk/why-
congress-cant-get-anything-done-in-2018.
100 Congress and the Public, supra note 54. 
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Smaller districts would allow a higher proportion of the districts’ 
residents to meaningfully and productively interact with their 
representatives and their staffs. At the same time, the Cube 
Root Rule would allow the chamber to function efficiently; 
it would prevent unwieldy expansion by eventually slowing 
its rate of growth. And the automatic nature of the of Cube 
Root Rule approach would spare Congress and the public 
contentious debates over House expansion every decade. Such 
debates might often end without any agreement. After all, it 
was disagreement over expansion that stilted the chamber’s 
growth over a century ago. The House must grow again, and the 
Cube Root Rule provides the most practical and effective way to 
make it happen.
2. The Legislative Proposal
The Constitution grants the legislative branch the power 
to determine House size and apportionment. Thus, we 
recommend legislation repealing the Permanent Apportionment 
Act of 1929 and directing that the size of the whole Congress 
be determined by the cubed root of the nation’s population 
following each decennial census. Under this proposal, the size 
of both the House and Senate would be equivalent to the cube 
root of the population. This legislation should be approved in 
time for it to be implemented immediately after the completion 
of the 2020 census. 
House expansion could be achieved through constitutional 
amendment, but we recommend using a statute given 
the urgency of reforming the House and the difficulty of 
amending the Constitution. Over 11,000 amendments have 
been proposed, but only 27 have been enacted.101 Passing a 
101 Eric Posner, The U.S. Constitution is Impossible to Amend, SLATE (May 5, 2014, 
4:22 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/05/amending-the-
constitution-is-much-too-hard-blame-the-founders.html.
new law would be easier, especially considering that winning 
the required approval of three-fourths of states for an 
amendment102 would be challenging when small states would 
likely oppose House expansion.103 
3. Public Knowledge and Support 
Lawmakers are unlikely to address House expansion without 
strong public support, and right now, that support is weak. 
A recent study on House expansion gauged respondents 
reactions to three objectives of House expansion: (1) decreasing 
constituency size, (2) preventing loss of seats by states, and 
(3) allowing for more women and minorities to serve in the 
chamber.104 None of these objectives taken alone led a majority 
of respondents to support increasing the House’s size.105 But 
when the supportive responses across the three questions were 
totaled, 55% of respondents favored expansion.106 These results 
suggest there is room for large public support for expanding the 
House if proponents rely on a range of arguments designed to 
appeal to large cross section of the public.107 The nine reasons 
for expansion discussed in Part II would be a good place for 
advocates to start. Supportive lawmakers should address the 
topic at town halls and in other settings where they interact 
with their constituents. Members of the general public who 
support expansion could advocate on social media and write 
op-eds and letters to newspapers. 
102 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
103 FAIRVOTE, MORE MEMBERS, MORE VOICES, supra note 76, at 16.
104 Brian Frederick, The People’s Perspective on the Size of the People’s House, 41 
PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 329, 330 (2008).
105 Id. at 332. 
106 Id. at 332-33. 
107 Id. at 333. 
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IV. Drawing Districts for an Expanded House
that both involved challenges to partisan gerrymandering of 
congressional districts.115 The lawmakers who created the 
districts at issue in both cases made no secret of their intention 
to draw lines that benefited their parties. In the North Carolina 
case, a Republican state legislator stated “I think electing 
Republicans is better than electing Democrats. So I drew this 
map to help foster what I think is better for the country.”116
But the Court held that partisan gerrymandering presented a 
political question that it did not have jurisdiction to resolve.117 
Its 5-4 decision asserted that it was impossible to create a 
constitutional standard for determining when gerrymandering 
was excessively partisan.118 The Court reasoned that regulating 
partisan gerrymandering was best left to the state legislatures 
and Congress.119
B. The Need to End Gerrymandering 
With a solution from the federal courts out of reach, a legislative 
solution to partisan gerrymandering becomes increasingly 
necessary. Congress needs to pass a law dramatically changing 
the way districts are drawn. 
Lawmakers will always have a natural incentive to help their 
parties through gerrymandering, while advances in technology 
are going to make gerrymandering worse in the future. Voting 
and voter registration data has become easily accessible, and 
predictive algorithms have gotten better at forecasting election 
results for proposed district maps, allowing state legislators to 
gerrymander their district maps with more precision.120
Partisan gerrymandering has broad consequences for 
America’s democratic process. The most blatant is the 
disproportionate representation of populations in Congress 
and state legislatures. North Carolina’s congressional district 
map, for example, resulted in 77% of the congressional seats 
being won by Republican candidates in the 2018 election, even 
though only 50% of North Carolina voters voted for Republican 
candidates.121 
115 Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2019).
116 Id. at 2491.
117 Id. 2506-07.
118 Id. at 2507.
119 See id. at 2507-08.
120 Jordan Ellenberg, How Computers Turned Gerrymandering Into a Science, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/opinion/
sunday/computers-gerrymandering-wisconsin.html.
121 North Carolina Election Results, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.
com/election-results/north-carolina/ (last updated Apr. 6, 2019).
House expansion is an important step in returning to the 
representative democracy the framers envisioned. Expansion, 
however, is not the only step that should be taken. The drawing 
of new district lines that would accompany an expansion of 
the House presents an opportunity to address the widespread 
and persistent use of partisan gerrymandering. In this Part, 
we propose a second reform: the use of the primary allocation 
method of districting. 
A. Background
Gerrymandering is a practice as old as America. The phrase 
“gerrymandering” dates back to 1812, from a political cartoon 
mocking a Massachusetts state legislative district drawn 
by Governor Elbridge Gerry to benefit his political party.108 
Through the present day, gerrymandering has existed in 
nearly every state in the union. For decades, the practice 
went largely unregulated. The Supreme Court refused to hear 
gerrymandering cases until its 1962 decision in the landmark 
case Baker v. Carr.109
Baker held that a challenge to a Tennessee state legislative 
district map, which had not been updated since 1901, presented 
a claim the courts could decide.110 The state’s population 
distribution had changed so significantly in six decades that 
districts in predominately African-American urban areas had 
ten times more residents than districts in predominately white 
rural areas.111 On remand, the federal trial court in Tennessee 
held that the districts violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.112 In 1964, the Supreme Court 
extended the “one person, one vote” principle to the drawing 
of congressional districts, holding in Wesberry v. Sanders that 
malapportioned districts within a state were unconstitutional.113 
The Court has also invalidated district maps that racially 
discriminate.114 
But these holdings have done little to prevent states from 
continuing to engage in partisan gerrymandering. And the 
Court has now ruled that partisan gerrymandering is beyond 
the federal courts’ reach. In June 2019, the Court decided 
two cases: one from Maryland and one from North Carolina 
108 ELMER CUMMINGS GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER 72-73 
(1907).
109 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
110 Id.
111 Id. at 192.
112 206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
113 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
114 See Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 
U.S. 339 (1960).
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Another consequence of gerrymandering, and our current 
congressional election format in general, is that it dilutes the 
number of “competitive” elections nationwide. This, in turn, 
results in lower total voter turnout. In 2018, there were 86 
congressional elections decided by ten percentage points or 
less.122 That is less than 20% of all congressional districts. In 
these 86 “competitive” elections, turnout was 16% higher 
than the 348 elections decided by more than ten percentage 
points.123 Voters have a greater incentive to turnout to vote 
when elections are more competitive, and voters feel like their 
vote has a greater impact on the outcome. If all congressional 
elections in 2018 had the same voter turnout as the competitive 
elections, there would have been more than 13.6 million 
additional votes cast nationwide. 
Gerrymandering also damages the country’s political climate 
and public trust in democratic institutions. A lack of fair 
representation causes voters in gerrymandered districts 
to become less engaged in democratic processes because 
they feel their involvement in politics does not matter. It also 
worsens political polarization because voters of a minority 
political party resent the majority party for diluting their 
representation in Congress and the state legislature. 
C.  Recent Proposed Gerrymandering 
Solutions
Several proposed solutions to gerrymandering have been 
recently implemented or proposed by several states.
1. Independent Commissions
There are currently only six states in the country that draw 
district maps using independent commissions: Alaska, 
Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, and Washington.124 All 
of these states but Alaska appoint their commissioners using 
a bipartisan method.125 Montana has only one congressional 
district and uses their independent commission to draw the 
state legislature district map.126 These states have 76 of the 435 
congressional seats, meaning independent commissions draw 
less than a fifth of districts nationwide.127 




124 Justin Levitt, Who Draws the Lines, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, LOY. L. SCH., http://
redistricting.lls.edu/who.php.
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126 Directory of Representatives, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://www.
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The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of independent 
commissions drawing congressional district maps in 
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission.128 The Court ruled that Article I, Section 4, which 
requires the “Time, Place, and Manner” of elections to be 
prescribed by the state legislatures, was broad enough to 
permit states to designate districting powers to independent, 
unelected bodies.129
Additionally, legislation passed in the House in 2019 would 
require states to use 15-member independent commissions 
to draw district lines.130 The Supreme Court has indicated that 
such a requirement is within Congress’ authority.131
Independent commissions have not been implemented in 
enough states for a comprehensive evaluation of their efficacy 
and fairness. But in states where they are used, the results 
are mixed. In Arizona and Washington, with nine and ten 
congressional districts respectively, the congressional districts 
won by each party in 2018 closely resemble the percentage 
of votes won by each party in those states.132 In California, 
however, the congressional seats won in 2018 do not closely 
resemble the percentage of votes won by each party. The 
Democratic Party won 66% of all votes cast in 2018 but won 
87% of the congressional districts in the state.133 This is an 
example of the flaw in independent commissions. While 
independent commissions result in fairer districts that both 
parties are happy with, they ultimately do not guarantee that 
the results of elections will accurately represent the people 
in those states. This is mostly caused by the first-past-the-
post electoral systems used in most states, but independent 
commission district drawing is still a tepid solution to a bigger, 
more fundamental problem. 
2. Proportional Districting
Proportional districting draws electoral districts and/or 
allocates seats in a legislature based on the percentage of 
votes parties receive in elections. This districting method was 
first devised by John Stuart Mill in the 19th century134 and has 
since been adopted in 87 countries, but not in any state in 
the U.S. Proportional districting’s most significant advantage 
is that it is much more responsive to the voting preferences 
128 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
129 Id. at 2673.
130 For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong., §§ 2401, 2411 (2019). 
131 See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2495.
132 Forecasting the Race for the House, supra note 124.
133 Id.
134 See JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1861).
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of the electorate from one election to another. Proportional 
representation would minimize wasted votes, uncompetitive 
districts, and “would make it impossible for one party to have a 
monopoly on the seats in a district.”135 
The most common type of proportional districting, the party list 
system, has large disadvantages. In a party list system, voters 
cast ballots for a party and seats are allocated based on the 
percentage of the votes each party gets.136 Voters cannot vote 
for a specific candidate, only for a group of candidates running 
under a particular party. Thus, the representatives sent to 
Congress or state legislatures would not be geographically tied 
to the voters they represent. It is important for representatives 
to have geographic ties to their constituencies to help ensure 
they will advocate for the needs of the people in the area of a 
state they represent, especially if those needs are unique and 
specific to that area. 
3. Multi-Member Districting
Multi-member districts (MMDs) are districts that send two 
or more representatives to Congress or the state legislature. 
These districts are drawn larger than single-member districts 
to accommodate multiple members. Currently, no states use 
MMDs to elect members to Congress, but ten states use 
MMDs to elect members to their state legislatures.137 There 
are several advantages to MMDs. MMDs make it harder to 
gerrymander and easier for third party candidates to be elected. 
They also promote challenges to incumbents and increase the 
ideological diversity of district representatives. 
But MMDs raise constitutional issues and may not be 
compatible with the Voting Rights Act. Federal law has required 
congressional districts to be single-member since 1842.138 The 
Supreme Court has not held multi-member state districts to 
be per se unconstitutional but it has affirmed a preference for 
single-member districts.139 The Court has invalidated MMDs 
135 Douglas J. Amy, How Proportional Representation Would Finally Solve Our 
Redistricting and Gerrymandering Problems, FAIRVOTE, https://www.fairvote.
org/how_proportional_representation_would_finally.
136 Matthew Yglesias, The Real Fix for Gerrymandering is Proportional 
Representation, VOX (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-
and-politics/2017/10/11/16453512/gerrymandering-proportional-
representation.
137 Karl Kurtz, Changes in Legislatures Using Multimember Districts After 
Redistricting, THICKET AT ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 11, 2012), https://ncsl.
typepad.com/the_thicket/2012/09/a-slight-decline-in-legislatures-using-
multimember-districts-after-redistricting.html.
138 The 1842 Apportionment Act, FAIRVOTE, http://archive.fairvote.org/library/
history/flores/apportn.htm.
139 Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549, 551-52 (1972).
for state legislatures when it produces discriminatory results 
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting 
Rights Act, regardless of discriminatory intent.140 Using multi-
member congressional districts would require a new federal 
law, and might require an amendment to the Constitution if 
they violate the “one person, one vote” rule applied by the 
Court in evaluating gerrymandering violations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.141 Therefore, creating a constitutionally acceptable 
MMD plan for Congress would be complicated and perhaps 
impractical. 
D. Primary Allocation Proposal
The solutions to gerrymandering discussed above have many 
benefits, and each are preferable to most of the current 
approaches to drawing congressional and state legislative 
districts. However, as discussed, each proposal has drawbacks. 
We endorse a new districting proposal that borrows elements 
from each of the proposals discussed in the prior section. 
Our proposal, Primary Allocation, would effectively end 
gerrymandering, promote more competitive elections, and 
increase the importance of each American’s vote in nearly every 
state and district in the country. 
1. How Primary Allocation Would Work
Primary Allocation would require two election rounds, a primary 
election and general election. The primary election would take 
place a few months before the general election. All candidates 
would be required to declare for the election and with a political 
party before the primary election. The primary election would 
be open to the entire state, and voters would select their 
preferred political parties, not candidates. Congressional and 
state legislative districts would then be allocated to political 
parties in proportion to their share of the vote. Each state’s 
political party that received multiple districts would draw 
district maps across the entire state for the general election. 
With each political party having its own, separate district maps 
for the whole state, districts would vary in geographic size and 
shape and would overlap with district maps drawn by other 
political parties. Political parties allocated one district would 
have an at-large district representing the entire state. 
140 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986).
141 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558. 
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The candidates chosen to represent the districts allocated 
to each political party would be determined by the general 
election. The general election would have declared candidates 
campaigning against members of their own party in their 
corresponding party districts. Only declared candidates from 
political parties that had been allocated districts from the 
primary election would be eligible to run in the general election. 
Similarly, voters in the general election would be eligible to 
vote only for the candidates of the party they supported in the 
primary election. Thus, candidates and voters who ran for or 
voted for political parties who are not allocated any districts 
would be barred from running or voting in the general election. 
The general elections for each eligible party would happen 
concurrently. With the districts allocated proportionately, the 
population of each party’s district would be similar in size to 
each other, but different in geographic size. 
2. Primary Allocation in Practice
To illustrate how Primary Allocation would work in practice, 
we will use a sample “State X” for examples. If State X has four 
congressional districts, that means there will be five possible 
electoral outcomes:






With five possible electoral outcomes, the vote percentage 
thresholds to determine allocation of seats in the primary 







Suppose in State X’s primary election, the Democratic Party 
receives 65% of the vote and the Republican Party receives 
35% of the vote. The resulting congressional district maps for 
the general election could resemble something like this:
The Republican Party is allocated one at-large congressional 
district, and the 35% of voters for the Republican Party from 
the primary election will participate in the one general election 
between the Republican candidates. The Democratic Party is 
allocated three congressional districts, and the 65% of voters 
for the Democratic Party from the primary election will vote 
in the general election between the Democratic candidates 
running in their respective districts. The Democratic Party is 
free to draw their three districts whichever way they choose, so 
long as the districts are roughly equal in population. 
Suppose there is a third party in State X who receives a 
significant number of votes in the primary election. If the results 
in the primary election leave the Democratic Party with 50% 
of the vote, the Republican Party with 32%, and the Libertarian 
Party with 18%, only three of the four district allocation 
thresholds have been reached by the parties combined, with 
one district outstanding. In such a scenario, the outstanding 
district will be allocated to the political party that is closest 
to their next district threshold. Here, the Libertarian Party is 
closest to their next threshold (20%), so the one outstanding 
district will be allocated to it, with two districts for the 
Democratic Party and one for the Republican Party.
3. Applying Primary Allocation to 2018 Election
Now we will examine how Primary Allocation would impact 
political representation when applied to a real-world scenario. 
The table below compares the results of the 2018 congressional 
election by state, and how the results would have changed 
under a Primary Allocation system. 
The total number of seats awarded to each party would not 
be much different than the actual results from the election, 
with only an eight-seat partisan shift. However, Primary 
Allocatoin would flip the party that controlled 66 congressional 
seats across 36 states. This would change the congressional 
representatives of about 50 million Americans.
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State Dem % Rep % Dem ‘18 Seats Rep ‘18 Seats Dem PA Seats Rep PA  Seats Change
AL 41 59 1 6 3 4 D +2
AK 47 53 0 1 0 1 -
AZ 50 48.7 5 4 5 4 -
AR 35 62.6 0 4 1 3 D +1
CA 66 32.6 46 7 35 18 R +11
CO 53 43 4 3 4 3 -
CT 62 38 5 0 3 2 R +2
DE 65 35 1 0 1 0 -
FL 47 52 13 14 13 14 -
GA 48 52 9 5 7 7 D +2
HI 75 23 2 0 2 0 -
ID 35 62 0 2 1 1 D +1
IL 60 39 13 5 11 7 R +2
IN 44 55 2 7 4 5 D +2
IA 51 47 3 1 2 2 R+1
KS 44 54 1 3 2 2 D +1
KY 39 50 1 5 2 4 D +1
LA 38 57 1 5 2 4 D +1
ME 53 39 2 0 1 1 R+1
MD 65 32 7 1 5 3 R +2
MA 78 20 9 0 7 2 R +2
MI 52 45 7 7 7 7 -
MN 55 44 5 3 5 3 -
MS 42 50 1 3 2 2 D +1
MO 43 55 2 6 3 5 D +1
MT 46 51 0 1 0 1 -
NE 38 62 0 3 1 2 D +1
NV 51 46 3 1 2 2 R+1
NH 55 44 2 0 1 1 R+1
NJ 60 39 11 1 7 5 R +4
NM 58 38 3 0 2 1 R+1
NY 67 31 21 6 18 9 R +3
NC 48 50 3 10 6 7 D +3
ND 36 60 0 1 0 1 -
OH 47 52 4 12 8 8 D +4
OK 36 62 1 4 2 3 D +1
OR 57 38 4 1 3 2 R+1
PA 55 45 9 9 10 8 D +1
RI 65 35 2 0 1 1 R+1
SC 44 54 2 5 3 4 D +1
SD 36 60 0 1 0 1 -
TN 39 59 2 7 3 6 D +1
TX 47 50 13 23 17 19 D +4
UT 36 59 1 3 1 3 -
VT 69 26 1 0 1 0 -
VA 56 43 7 4 6 5 R+1
WA 63 35 7 3 6 4 R+1
WV 41 58 0 3 1 2 D +1
WI 53 46 3 5 4 4 D +1
WY 30 64 0 1 0 1 -
Total 239 196 231 204 R +8
Source: Forecasting the Race for the House, supra note 124.
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4. E"ects and Future Elections
The most important effect of Primary Allocation on future 
elections is that it would end partisan gerrymandering. This 
districting method makes it impossible for parties to dilute 
votes from the rival political party because political parties can 
only draw their own districts. Parties could still draw districts 
to protect long-term incumbents from challengers within their 
own party. But all districts would be required to be similar in 
population size and to comply with the Voting Rights Act, so 
district map manipulation would be of little concern when it 
comes to partisan and ideological representation. Coupled 
with the proposed expansion of the size of the House of 
Representatives, Primary Allocation will help elected Congress 
members be more personalized and accurately representative 
to the voters in each district. 
Primary Allocation would also greatly increase turnout by 
making almost all congressional and state legislative elections 
much more competitive. The primary elections would be 
competitive even in highly partisan states. Voters would be 
highly incentivized to vote in primary elections because those 
elections would determine how many congressional seats 
their political party would be awarded for the general election. 
Third-party voters would also have a strong incentive to 
turnout because their party might have a realistic chance at 
securing a seat in Congress. There are no third-party politicians 
in Congress after the 2018 election; Primary Allocation 
would likely change that and give third-party voters greater 
representation. 
Voters of all parties in all areas of the country will have much 
greater incentives to turnout to vote in the general elections 
as well. In 2018, more than 80% of congressional elections 
were decided by double-digit percentages. The results of such 
elections are essentially pre-determined before any votes 
are cast due to the partisan make up of the districts. This 
gives voters in these districts much less incentive to vote. 
Under Primary Allocation, the partisanship of a particular 
geographic area would not pre-determine the winners of each 
district’s general election because the races would be between 
candidates from the same party.
A concern raised by the Primary Allocation system is the 
practicality of adding an additional election day for every two-
year election cycle. While the additional cost would surely be 
worth it for the improvement over the current election method, 
online voting could alleviate the increase in costs. Countries 
like South Korea142 and Switzerland143 have already begun using 
online voting, and West Virginia successfully tested online 
voting using blockchain technology in the 2018 election.144 
Recent trends point towards fully secure online voting being 
possible in the near future, which would make holding two 
election days per election cycle much more viable. 
Another possible concern with Primary Allocation is its 
constitutionality and conformity with the Voting Rights Act. Any 
legislation to enact Primary Allocation districting should contain 
requirements to comply with the Voting Rights Act relating to 
equality in district population and representation of minority 
groups. Although Primary Allocation would permit multiple 
district maps drawn for each state, the format for drawing 
these districts would be nearly the same as the current format, 
so there is nothing about Primary Allocation that is inherently 
incompatible with the Voting Rights Act.
There is also nothing about Primary Allocation that is inherently 
unconstitutional. It complies with the “one person, one vote” 
rule established in Reynolds v Sims.145 It maintains single-
member districts that the Supreme Court has previously 
held it prefers over multi-member districts, and proportional 
representation has never been declared unconstitutional. In 
fact, proportional representation is more fundamentally aligned 
with equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, so any 
challenge to Primary Allocation based on its use of proportional 
representation is unlikely to be struck down as unconstitutional.
E.  A Legislative Answer to a Persistent 
Problem
Legislation can be passed at the state and federal level to 
implement Primary Allocation. But the political benefits 
of gerrymandering would likely disincentivize many state 
lawmakers from changing the current districting rules. To 
ensure access to Primary Allocation elections in all states, a 
congressional districting amendment to the constitution is 
needed.
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Each House member currently represents, on average, about 
750,000 constituents. With an ever-increasing population, 
this number can only grow. At what point is each individual’s 
representation so diluted that he or she has no meaningful 
say in Congress? At what point do the responsibilities of 
over-grown districts simply become too much to bare for 
House members? The 435-member cap on the House of 
Representatives should not persist. The House should be 
expanded in a measured, formulaic manner that responds 
changes in the national population. Thus, Congress should 
codify the Cube Root Rule as soon as possible to address the 
multitude of issues that decades of inaction have caused. 
The framers vision cannot be realized in the modern world, 
however, without addressing the ever-present use of partisan 
gerrymandering. Congress needs to allow for a new districting 
model—Primary Allocation—in its elections. Only then will the 
country have a chance of reclaiming the People’s House. 
Conclusion

